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Abstract. 
 
 
The global financial crisis which began in east Asia in 1997 is not over, neither is the 
inquest into its implications for adjustment policy. In the wake of this crisis, we focus 
here on the role of capital controls, which formed a much publicised part of the crisis-
coping strategy in one country (Malaysia) and, less openly, were also deployed by 
other crisis-afflicted countries. Evaluation so far has examined different  target 
variables with different  estimation methods, generally concentrating on efficiency 
and stability indicators and ignoring equity measures; it has also typically treated 
‘control’ as a one-zero dummy variable, ignoring the ‘quality’ of intervention and in 
particular the extent to which efficiency gains are obtained in exchange for controls. 
Partly because of these limitations, the literature has reached no consensus on the 
impact of controls, nor therefore about where they fit within the set of post-crisis 
defence mechanisms.  We propose an approach in which the government plays off 
short-term political security against long-term economic gain; the more insecure its 
political footing, the greater the weight it gives to political survival, which is likely to 
increase the probability of controls being imposed. The modelling of this approach 
generates a governmental ‘policy reaction function’ and an impact function for 
controls, which are estimated by simultaneous panel-data methods across a sample of 
thirty developing and transitional countries between 1980-2003, using, for the period 
since 1996, the ‘new’ IMF dataset which differentiates between controls by type. 
   
We find that controls appear to cause increases in income equality, and are 
significantly associated with political insecurity and relatively low levels of openness 
to trade. They do not, in our analysis, materially influence the level of whole-economy 
productivity or GDP across the sample of countries examined, although they do 
influence productivity in particular sectors, in particular manufacturing. But the 
dispersion around this central finding is wide: the tendency for controls to depress 
productivity by encouraging rent-seeking sometimes is, and sometimes is not, 
counteracted by purposive government policy actions to maintain competitiveness. 
Whether or not this happens – whether, as we put it, controls are ‘smart’, and the 
manner in which they are smartened -  is vital, on both efficiency and equity grounds. 
We devise a formula for, and make the case for capital controls which are time-
limited, and contain an inbuilt incentive to increased productivity, as a means of  
improving the sustainability and equity of the adjustment process whilst keeping to a 
minimum the cost in terms of productive efficiency. 
 
 
JEL classification: O16,O19, P16, D63. 
Keywords: Capital controls, income distribution,political economy. 
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1.Introduction: cross-country and case-study evidence.   The global 
financial convulsion which began with the ‘east Asian crisis’ is still not over, as 
recent events in Argentina, Bolivia and other countries bear witness. Still less 
do we know the institutional and policy lessons which should be drawn from it: 
which supplements to the existing international financial architecture are 
necessary to make it stable, and how the threats to that stability can be 
minimised. As is well documented (e.g. Williamson, 1999) the crisis, for the 
most part, afflicted economies whose macro-economic fundamentals ( budget 
deficit, inflation etc.) were relatively sound1; consequently,  the ‘stabilisation 
plus structural adjustment’  prescription of the 1980s, whatever merits it may 
have had in relation to the global recession of that time, could not be expected  
on its own to form a large part of the remedy for the capital-account crises of 
the early twenty-first century. For the same reasons, preventive measures 
against crises of this type have not been easy to identify.  In varying degree, 
governance problems relating to the exposure of the private sector to default 
risk, and to the regulation of the private sector, have surfaced in a number of 
the countries hit by such crises, and it can be claimed (Stiglitz 1998, 2003, 
etc.) that regulatory action to manage these risks has helped the return to 
normality for the majority of afflicted countries. However, (1) regulatory reform 
has no means constituted the entire solution to crisis, which in a number of 
cases has much deeper-seated economic and political causes; (2) regulatory 
reform takes time, and even in those countries where it is helpful, is often not 
a feasible short-term remedy for protecting liquidity in face of a large-scale 
haemorrhage of hot money. The question therefore arises what else is 
needed, beyond the lender-of-last-resort support which the IMF already 
provides. 
 In this context, we here re-evaluate the case for controls on inflows and 
outflows of capital in developing countries.  In the long term, there exists a 
theoretical presumption in favour of free capital movements2; but in the short 
term, at least since Keynes’ Treatise on Money (Keynes 1930: chapter 37), 
the volatility and unpredictability of short-term capital movements has been 
identified as a major potential cause of macro-economic crisis and inefficiency 
in global resource allocation, and this awareness, mixed with less reputable 
political pressures, has encouraged many countries to keep controls in 
position even in face of  the widespread trends towards liberalisation of the 
1980s and 90s (Cooper, 1999: 97).  When controls were removed, this was 
often unwisely timed, and  the East Asian crisis itself has been blamed by 
many commentators on the over-rapid removal of controls under IMF 
auspices (e.g. Stiglitz 2003); meanwhile, several countries afflicted by the 
crisis have either, like Malaysia, imposed controls pre-emptively in order to 
obviate being forced into choosing from the IMF’s policy menu, or, like 
Argentina, imposed them in the form of a short-term tourniquet until bought 
out by an IMF stand-by arrangement. The question of what, if any, role to 
                                                 
1 The average budget deficit at the time of crisis onset, in Asian countries afflicted by the crisis, was 
around 2  per cent (0.8, 0.5 and 2.0 per cent of GDP for Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, respectively). 
The size of the budget deficit was rather worse in Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico have average deficits of 3.0, 6.9 and 7.4 per cent of GDP, respectively, between 1996-2000). 
2Many commentators have supported this view by emphasising  the poor performance of the inter-war 
global economy in the 1920s and 30s, at a time when pervasive capital controls were in force. 
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allocate to capital controls thus lies at the heart of the post-East Asian 
‘international financial architecture’ debate.  
 There is as yet little resolution to this debate at either a theoretical or 
an empirical level. Conceptually, there is a conventional presumption in favour 
of openness, but more specifically it is clear that the type and timing of control 
matters, as previously discussed: one argument of this type states that 
indirect (tax-based) controls, of the kind imposed e.g. by Chile throughout the 
1990s, are ‘superior’ to direct controls as a means of thwarting a balance of 
payments crisis. Eichengreen (1999). for example, argues that outflow 
controls inevitably act as an artificial sticking-plaster designed to relieve a 
government from having to undertake fundamental surgery3; however, as 
Cooper (1999:124) and Irwin et al. (2004) have emphasised, where the 
conditions for effective liberalisation (low barriers to international trade, well-
developed financial markets, and a tax regime for capital that does not differ 
markedly from world norms)  are not present,  capital account liberalisation 
may do serious damage.  
Empirically, most of the literature has not caught up with these 
qualitative concerns, and typically uses only an ‘on-off’ one-zero dummy 
variable on the right-hand side of the estimating equation to capture the effect 
of controls.  On the left-hand side, a range of indicators of efficiency and 
stability have been used, but none as yet which reflect the distribution of 
income between particular beneficiary groups, or the related political payoff.  
There is consensus (Table 1) that controls lower the level and instability of 
interest rates, but with some evidence (Edison and Reinhart, 2000) that this 
impact varies between countries. There is no consensus on the impact of 
controls on investment and productivity, with some authors, such as Quinn, 
finding evidence of a negative impact of controls, and others discovering a 
neutral impact; thus the question of whether there is a stability-efficiency 
tradeoff is unresolved4. Maybe most disturbingly of all, there is no evidence at 
all on what controls deliver in terms of equity and, relatedly, in terms of what 
may be called political effectiveness, that is on the government’s ability to 
survive.. As a consequence, not only can the available data can be used to 
support many stories (Table 1), but the story which matters for many of the 
users of controls, including the most idealistic as well as the most politically 
motivated, remains untested. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 ‘The first-best solution in this case is not to impose capital controls but to eliminate the distortions 
conducive to excessively expansionary monetary and fiscal policies… To say that an economic 
emergency such as the current crisis in emerging markets justifies the use of emergency controls such 
as Malaysia’s is an admission that the political will to follow through with more fundamental reforms 
is not there.’ (Eichengreen 1999, pp. 55-58) 
4 One reason for this discrepancy may be that the study by Quinn is restricted to an earlier time period, 
from 1964 to 1989, thereby excluding consideration of the effectiveness of controls during the ‘East 
Asian crisis’ and indeed during the whole of the 1990s. 
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Table 1. Empirical studies on impact of capital controls 
 
 
Interest rates:   GDP  
Level stability 
Capital 
flows 
Productivity, 
etc 
Rodrik(1998) .. 
Insignificant 
correlation 
    
Quinn(1997) -     
Duasa(2004), 
Chapter 4 & 5 
  + + -5
Doriasami(2004)  + -   
Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti( 1995 ) 
.. 
Insignificant 
correlation 
    
Edison and 
Reinhart(2000) 
  + in 
Malaysia 
(nb not in 
Thailand) 
  
Kaplan and 
Rodrik(2001) 
+ in 
Malaysia 
    
IMF: Otker-
Robe(2000) 
   + 
 
 
Tamirisa (2001)    Generally + 
(- in 
Malaysia) 
 
Athukorala(2001)  +  +  
Notation: +,controls cause an ‘improvement ‘, (e.g. higher GDP, lower interest rates); 
 -,‘negative’ influence of controls, …neutral impact.  
 
  
This paper seeks to resolve some of these ambiguities, and in particular to 
estimate the impact of controls in a way that treats the decision to impose 
them as endogenous to political conditions. A simple model which 
incorporates these considerations is therefore presented in the next section, 
and tested in Section 3. The conclusions are presented in Section 4, and 
provisionally are: 
(i) capital controls may be an important device for protecting  
a government’s constituency – increasingly including the 
economically vulnerable. In particular, they appear overall, both 
across countries and within them, to have the effect of making the 
distribution of income more equal. 
(ii) Hence, the more politically vulnerable a country is, the stronger the 
case for controls, as there is evidence from the east Asian crisis 
that the prompt imposition of controls may protect countries from 
political turbulence which wipes out potential efficiency gains. 
                                                 
5 But this effect disappears for high-growth firms, suggesting that competition effects come into play.  
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(iii) However, as generally acknowledged, they may have productivity-
depressing effects, and the more effectively pacing mechanisms 
(‘smart’ controls, as we call them) can be built in which offset these 
effects, ensure that controls are temporary and do not block 
necessary progress towards necessary regulatory reform, the 
stronger the overall case for controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The model: political risk minimisation vs. long-term economic 
advantage  
 
              Economic policy is operated by governments first and 
foremost, we assume, to achieve the objective of political survival. If hit by 
crisis, they therefore seek to extract themselves from that crisis in whatever 
way will minimise the political damage to them. This is visualised, in Figure 1, 
in terms of a trade-off between economic benefit in the specific sense of 
perceived long-term gains from stabilisation (measured on the vertical axis) 
and short-term political loss in the sense of vulnerability, as measured by 
some indicator such as government popularity. In a general sense, the 
government wishes to move north-west, in other words to escape from 
economic crisis in the medium term and at the same time to minimise the 
risks to its own short-term survival. However, the two objectives need to be 
balanced: too rapid an attempt to move on to a sustainable economic 
recovery path, which throws the costs of adjustment on to groups in a position 
to overthrow the government, may push the government into a ‘coup trap’ 
(Londregan and Poole 1990 ) and cause the escape attempt to be itself 
frustrated. Indeed, we can imagine that any government pictures policy 
options, and states of the economy, in terms of a ‘survival threshold’ (the thick 
dotted line in Figure 1) that may not be crossed without the likelihood of losing 
office. Each economic policy option has consequences which can be mapped 
in terms of their expected economic and political payoffs; if these 
consequences are visually connected together, the result is the continuous 
black line on Figure 1, which we may call the opportunity locus; only options 
to the southeast of this line are feasible. Clearly no rational government will 
choose options below the survival threshold, and so its task reduces to that of 
finding ‘the best’ option on the opportunity locus above the survival threshold. 
Conventionally, this is done by superimposing a preference function, as 
illustrated on Figure 1;  a mathematical working-out is in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1. Stabilisation decisions as seen by government: stylised view 
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               The opportunity locus can be somewhat likened to a pr
function: it is the set of economic and political economic outcom
given policy mix will ‘produce’. It will move downwards (i.e. incre
government’s likelihood of losing office) if there is an unanticipat
shock (for example, the price of exports collapses, or an aid flow
will move upwards if the ‘productivity ‘ of the policy mix can be in
increased. We believe that, at least potentially, capital controls c
this sense in a ‘productivity-increasing’ role, reducing for any giv
economic performance the risk that the government will be force
office6. 
 How do they achieve this? Through two channels, we wo
first through giving the government’s constituencies the impress
‘in control of’, rather than the captive of, the stormy seas of globa
and secondly by giving those constituencies that are in a positio
breakwater against those forces. As long as controls are effectiv
direct level, that of stopping the haemorrhage of short-term fund
claimed by the government as a necessary victory of ‘national’ o
interests – and the making of the claim will win support from nati
interests, especially in the fields of labour and non-tradable econ
activities. Controls are in fact usually successful at this level (Ta
certainly on Malaysian evidence, this brings a political dividend w
                                                 
6 For supporting evidence from the recent ‘East Asian’ crisis, see in particular Table 
7 According to a series of national polls by the Malaysian National University, there 
jump in Dr. Mahathir’s popularity from 1989-90 to 1994-96 (Malaysians satisfied wi
were 91% in 1996, compared to 87% in 1995, 86% in 1994, 66% in 1990 and 52% inPerceived  
increase in  risks 
to political 
survival oduction 
es which a 
ase the 
ed negative 
 is lost) and it 
 some way 
an be seen in 
en level of 
d out of 
uld argue – 
ion that it is ‘ 
l finance , 
n to hurt it a 
e at the most 
s, this can be 
ver ‘global’ 
onalist 
omic 
ble 1) and, 
ith it7. The 
3 below. 
was a very clear 
th his leadership 
 1989). Less is 
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basic argument is that if countries are politically vulnerable, this tips the 
balance of the argument in favour of controls, by reducing the risk of political 
instability, of the kind which hit, for example, Indonesia in 1999, Argentina in 
early 2002, and Bolivia in February and October 2003.  By imposing controls 
relatively early within their respective crises, Malaysia and Thailand may have 
prevented the violence which occurred in the former group of countries. 
 
             More broadly, controls may improve not only chances of political 
survival, but also equity, because controls protect jobs, and thus very 
possibly, if the elasticities are right, increase the share of labour in the 
economy. Those who benefit are those whose incomes would have been 
lower, or whose jobs would have been lost, but for the imposition of controls – 
typically in companies whose managers would have taken their money out of 
the country but for control8. It is natural to think of these as being companies 
which are marginally competitive, but as the literature  on herd behaviour 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990) illustrates, the connection between 
competitiveness and the behaviour of investors may be lost in a panicky 
environment, and highly productive companies may be stripped of their capital 
irrespective of performance if members of the herd of inward investors decide 
to repatriate their capital as a group – because the country is perceived as 
being a poor risk even though the company is competitive 9. Essentially, the 
companies which gain from control are the companies most exposed to 
speculative pressure, which for the reason mentioned has a loose connection 
with productive efficiency.  There is some evidence from Malaysian data 
(Duasa 2004) that giving them temporary protection via capital controls has 
reduced the value of the Gini coefficient and Theil index of inequality ( in other 
words that capital controls may be progressive) – partly for the traditional 
reason that they protect employment, but partly for the highly non-traditional 
reason that they appear to bring about a reallocation of production in favour of 
faster-growing companies and women workers in the manufacturing sector10. 
This proposition is tested on our cross-section sample in section 3 below. The 
broader significance of this result is that capital controls may as a 
consequence be increasingly consistent with the kind of pro-poor 
development policies being increasingly advocated to achieve, for example, 
the International Development Targets11. If it is right that through the judicious 
use of capital controls the entire international financial architecture can be 
made globally more progressive ,not only in the country imposing the controls 
                                                                                                                                            
known about opinion polls after 1996, but the McKeever Institute of Economic Policy Analysis, in Fall 
2003,  rates Malaysian capital controls policy at 4.0 and a pegged currency at 5.0 ( on a scale from 
from 1.0,(perfectly obstructionist) to 5.0,(perfect facilitation of wealth creation), which lifted the 
popularity of government after the turmoil of crisis. 
8 It has also been argued that controls redistribute income from capitalists to workers (Alesina and 
Tabellini 1989), thereby equalising the distribution of income. 
9 It will be recalled that Keynes (1930) likened the criteria of international investors to those applied in 
‘a beauty contest, but one in which the judges are asked to select not the most beautiful contestant, but 
rather the one that the other judges would choose as the most beautiful’(see Cooper 1999:107) 
10 See note 16 below. 
11 We have suggested (Mosley 2004) that with increasing democratisation, the payoff to redistributive 
pro-poor policies is increasing, through a number of channels: pro-poor policies increase the number of 
people that can be reached, reduce inequality and thereby increase social capital and finally are 
capable, in poor countries, of levering aid finance under HIPC and similar initiatives.   
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but in all countries– and the evidence is by no means conclusive -, this 
warrants a particularly thorough search to see whether the supposed negative 
effects of controls on allocation can be finessed or escaped. 
 
The effects on productive efficiency are highly uncertain. It has been an 
axiom of the Bretton Woods institutions, ever since their foundation, that in the 
absence of trade distortions global resource allocation will be optimised in the 
absence of controls on capital movements, but any one country will not 
necessarily gain if it reduces controls in an imperfect environment. A country 
imposing controls will suffer in terms of productivity if the existence of the 
controls raises costs or diminishes effort to increase productivity12 – the 
standard moral-hazard argument against protection of any sort; but this 
response to protection is not automatic, and, as observed earlier, the firms 
hurt by speculative outflows are not necessarily the uncompetitive ones13. The 
interesting question in political economy is whether there is any way of 
designing in an offset to this diminution of effort, so that a country is able to 
enjoy the political benefit of controls without suffering the economic loss of 
reduced productivity through giving encouragement to rent-seekers.  
The obvious answer is to take inspiration from the approach of 
countries such as South Korea and Mauritius to targeted subsidies, and  to 
impose either a performance contract or a selective exposure to competition 
to industries which benefit from capital controls, so that pressure to increase 
productivity persists even while temporary relief from herd behaviour is 
granted. We call this a ‘smart’ capital control.  An additional important way of 
sustaining productivity is to make it known that controls are to be kept in force 
only for a limited period, by analogy with an infant-industry subsidy, and will 
then be removed.  To the extent that this is done, productivity in sectors which 
are given such a stimulus may not decline and may even increase14. There is 
some evidence from Malaysia that offsetting measures of this kind were 
implemented at least in manufacturing, with the consequence that in that 
sector productivity marginally rose after the imposition of controls in 1998, 
whereas in other sectors it fell (Duasa 2004, chapter 5)15. The general 
                                                 
12 It may not do so, because of the ‘herd behaviour’ arguments introduced above. 
13 There is an analogy with the literature on overseas aid. This literature presented, especially during 
the 1980s, the argument that aid flows presented the recipient with an incentive to minimise tax effort 
and investment in order to maximise the case for further aid inflows which would buy off political 
opposition; and appeared to be supported by negative correlations between aid and growth, especially 
in Africa. But if aid conditionality can be made ‘smart’ enough, then the effects of aid on growth and 
poverty become positive (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004); and most aid now appears, on 
balance, to be growth-increasing (Hansen and Tarp, 2001). 
14 One may compare the arguments for and against minimum wages. Minimum wages have 
traditionally been seen as an interference with the market mechanism which costs jobs, but recent 
experiments with the reintroduction of minimum wages, in the US and Britain in particular, has shown 
that in an environment of imperfect markets where stimuli to productivity  improvement are given, 
minimum wages may act as an ‘efficiency wage’ and stimulate increased productivity and even 
increased employment. The same applies to capital controls, with the same caveats, in an environment 
of imperfect markets where stimuli to productivity  improvement are provided., 
15 This took the form partly of encouraging competition (even among firms whose managers were 
known allies of the Prime Minister) and partly the form of training subsidies for firms expected to be 
exposed to high levels of competition, particularly in the manufacturing sector. As a result, the 
manufacturing sector marked higher productivity growth with 9.11% and 11.05% in 1999 and 2000 
respectively, as compared to low productivity growth in the non-manufacturing sector which grew at an 
average rate of 0.7% in 1999 and 2.3% in 2000. 
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argument is conveyed by Figure 2. The overall benefits to capital controls are 
measured on the vertical axis. Considering for the moment only the efficiency 
impacts, these can be expected to be negative (thick line on Figure 2) if no 
countervailing measures against rent-seeking by protected industries are 
taken; but as the level of countervailing measures (measured along the 
horizontal axis) increases, so the net efficiency cost to the economy of 
countervailing measures diminishes and eventually, in the diagram, becomes 
positive. Estimates of the empirical dividend to be derived from countervailing 
measures of this kind are presented in the next section.  
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Figure 2. Efficiency and composite impacts of capital controls 
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Putting together the two parts of the argument, 
 
(i) to the extent that rent-seeking effects on productivity are 
counteracted by appropriate measures which sustain the degree of 
competition within the economy, the negative welfare impact of 
controls diminishes. 
(ii) If other effects of controls, in particular on interest rates, investment 
and income distribution, and thence on political stability, are 
positive, the ‘feasibility locus’ of the incumbent government (from 
Figure 1) will be pushed up by the imposition of capital controls. In 
the diagram above, we represent this set of effects – on the 
evidence of Table 1 - as being consistently positive, as a net benefit 
of controls regardless of the level of performance incentives.  
 
           Thus the overall effect of controls is the resultant of these two 
effects. We now seek to estimate the empirical magnitudes of the effects, 
both across a small sample directly affected by the east Asian crisis for 
which we have political-response data  and across a broader sample, of all 
developing countries for which data are available, which encompasses this 
crisis group. 
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3. Empirical strategy 
 
From the model of the previous section (set out in mathematical form in the 
Appendix) we derive a reduced form in the shape of the following two 
equations:  
 
 
From equation (10) of the appendix, the optimal level of controls  is: 
 
C* = a10 -  φ                                                                (1) ; ((10) in appendix) 
        φa5  a5 
 
where φ = -a3a5a8 –a52a8(σ(Y))
                   a5a8I 
 
and from equation (7) of the appendix, the impact of controls is 
 
 
dW   = (∂W1/ ∂C) +(∂W2/ ∂C) = a1 +a2 (∂R/∂C) + a5a8   (2); (11) in appendix) 
dC 
 
Table 2 sets out the meaning of these terms and the way in which we 
represent them in the empirical estimations of this section. 
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Table 2. Factors affecting the optimal level and effectiveness of capital 
controls 
 
Variable or parameter Meaning Indicator variable used 
in regressions for 
testing 
a2 Response of economy 
to ‘offsetting incentives’ 
 
a3 Country-specific level of 
political risk 
Bank of England country 
risk score 
a5 Impact of income 
inequality on political 
risk/conflict risk 
Sachs-Warner political 
instability indicator 
a8 Impact of shocks on 
political risk 
Income instability 
measure 
∂R/∂C ‘Offsetting incentives’ 
established by 
government to 
encourage 
competitiveness 
(Changes in) real 
exchange rate; SMART 
variables (see pp. 
15/16). 
I Intensity of reform (Changes in) Sachs-
Warner openness index 
G(Y) Gini coefficient of 
inequality 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality 
 
 
a. Large-sample analysis 
 
We test  hypotheses (1) (determination of level of controls) and (2)  (impact of 
controls) by two methods, one large-sample and extending back over the 
entire last twenty years, the other confined to the small sample of those 
severely affected by the ‘East Asian crisis’ and to the years since 1999. The 
large-sample results, which report the influence of the variables listed in table 
2 on controls, equity and efficiency measures, are reported in Table 3. By our 
previous argument the decision to impose controls is endogenous to political  
and social conditions, and social conditions, in the shape of the Gini 
coefficient, are themselves endogenous to growth rates and political 
conditions. Hence the model is estimated by the simultaneous-equation 
technique, GMM (generalised method of moments)16, with an additional 
equation to determine the causes of the Gini coefficient of inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 GMM estimation is based on the assumption that the disturbances in the equations in the equations 
are correlated with a set of independent variables. The GMM estimator selects parameter estimates so 
that the correlations between the instruments and disturbances are as close to zero as possible. 
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Table 3. Determination and impact of capital controls: simultaneous-
equations estimation 
Panel data estimation for period 1980-2003 : data averaged over five-year periods (see note 
4). Student’s t-statistics in parentheses: * denotes significance at 5% level, ** denotes 
significance at 1% level. 
  
 Dependent variable 
 (1)Rate of change of GDP  (2)Incidence of 
controls(C) 
(3)Gini 
coefficient of 
inequality (G) 
       Estimation 
       method 
 
Regression 
coefficients on 
independent 
variables: 
OLS             OLS                    GMM        GMM OLS         GMM OLS GMM 
Constant 5.12* 
(2.07) 
2.34* 
(2.00) 
2.12 
(.50) 
1.33 
(0.54) 
9.00** 
(10.30
) 
3.53 
(1.17) 
60.8** 
(22.2) 
63.5** 
(4.80) 
Per capita income 
in 
1980(INITINC) 
-0.0006* 
(2.39) 
-0.0008** 
(2.81) 
-0.0005 
(1.28) 
-0.0009* 
(-2.40) 
    
Investment 
rate(INV) 
0.16** 
(6.09) 
0.15** 
(5.72) 
0.007 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.62) 
  0.021 
(0.23) 
 
Primary school 
enrolment rate 
-0.0089 
(0.57) 
-0.018 
(1.22) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.01) 
    
Gini coefficient 
of inequality 
-0.04 
(1.43) 
       
Sachs-Warner 
openness index  
 1.12* 
(2.30) 
1.39 
(1.44) 
 -
1.50** 
(2.58) 
  12.2 
(1.36) 
Controls 
indicator   
.-0.04 
(0.38) 
 -0.43 
(0.09) 
   -1.76** 
(6.96) 
-2.54* 
(1.98) 
‘Smart controls’ 
indicator (i) 
 0.0004* 
(1.89) 
 
0.02 
(1.85) 
     
‘Smart controls’ 
indicator (ii) 
   0.009* 
(2.39) 
    
Real exchange 
rate 
index(1995=100) 
(RER) 
-0.007* 
(1.39) 
       
Rate of growth of 
GDP 
    0.16 
(1.60) 
0.35 
(1.11) 
  
Bank of England 
country risk score 
    -1.78* 
(2.18) 
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Sachs-Warner 
political 
instability 
measure (PI) 
 
 
 
-1.15* 
(2.35) 
 
 
 
-1.06* 
(2.17) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.98** 
(3.20) 
 
 
 
7.87* 
(2.30) 
 
 
 
 
-0.87 
(0.38) 
 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
included in 
regression 
116 132 118 75 115 111 131 131 
R2 0.399 0.314 NA 0.366 0.163   0.317        NA 
Instrumental 
variables 
  RER, PI, INITINC, 
GINI 
 C, RER, 
GINI, 
INITINC, 
OPEN-
NESS, 
SCHOOL, 
GROWTH 
 PI, INV 
J-statistic for 
adequacy of 
instruments 
  0.014   0.002  6.22E-
24 
Sources: Measure of capital controls: from IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions, various issues. Dataset for this variable is displayed in Appendix  
2,pp. 29-31 below. 
Openness index and political instability indicator: from Sachs and Warner(1995), table 
A1,p.69: ‘Variables used to construct the POL variable’, and appendix, pp. 72-95. 
Notes: (1) The ‘capital controls’ indicator has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 
13. The thirteen possible categories of controls which may enter into the index are restrictions 
on trading in: capital market securities; money market instruments; collective investment 
securities; derivatives and other instruments; commercial credits; financial credits; guarantees 
and other financial backup facilities; direct investment; liquidation of direct investment; real 
estate transactions; personal capital transactions; also provisions specific to commercial 
banks and institutional investors. For data on controls indicator see Appendix 2. 
(2) ‘Smart controls’ indicator  (i) = controls indicator x(200 – real exchange rate) 
(3) ‘Smart controls’ indicator (ii) = (control2. (80-current competitiveness index rank). The 
index rank is the rank of country competitiveness (out of 80 countries) made up of two 
subindices, the quality of the national business environment and the degree of ‘company 
sophistication’, indicating the strength of within-company deterrents to rent-seeking. 
Competitiveness data from Asian Development Bank website, http://www.adb.org. ‘Control2’ 
is the thirteen-point scale measure from Appendix 2 (see columns relating to years from 
1997-2002 inclusive). 
(4) Country sample: Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, China, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya, South Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,  Poland, Russian Federation,  Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 150 observations based on five-year 
averages (1980-85 to 2000-2003) for each variable for each of these 30 countries. 
(5) The J-statistic is used to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions when we have more 
instruments than parameters to estimate. Under the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions (number of instruments minus number of parameters) are satisfied, the J-statistic 
times the number of regression observations is asymptotically χ2 with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions. 
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The basic story of Table 3 may be told as a triangle of simultaneous 
relationships:   
(1) Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient or the Theil-
index, is significantly and positively influenced by the presence 
and strength of capital controls17 (equation 3 in the table). This 
finding positively influences the likelihood that capital controls 
can push upwards the government’s ‘feasibility line’, as depicted 
on figure 1, since greater equality broadens the government’s 
potential constituency of support. The controls in this equation – 
the investment rate and the political vulnerability indicator – are 
not significant. 
(2) The intensity of control is endogenous – not only to indicators of 
economic weakness, as in the paper by Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti(1995), but also to measures of political vulnerability (the 
political instability indicator and Bank of England risk index), as 
per the model of our Figure 1. Governments particularly fearful 
of the consequences of a sudden outflow of capital on their 
power base may be particularly apt to impose capital controls as 
a relatively secure way of achieving short-term protection of 
reserve levels. 
(3) As in the analysis of  Rodrik (1998) the impact of controls on 
GNP is insignificant once standard ‘new growth theory’ 
influences on the growth rate – in particular initial income, 
investment, school enrolments, openness of the economy and 
political vulnerability – are controlled for.  Hence it is not 
inevitable that the imposition of controls will inflict on 
government a trade-off between increased equity and a lower 
growth rate – whether or not there is a trade-off of this kind 
depends on the policy environment and in particular, as we have 
argued in Figure 2, the extent to which competitiveness is 
maintained in face of the potential encouragements to rent-
seekers offered by controls. In Table 3, we have used two 
indicators of the smartness of controls: (SMART(i)) the intensity 
of control weighted by the real exchange rate and (SMART(ii)) 
an interaction term between control and competitiveness18. Both 
measures of smartness score well:, as illustrated by Figure 3, 
                                                 
17 Duasa (2004) has already obtained this result on a time-series basis for Malaysia between 1980 and 
2003. 
18 The logic underlying the two SMART indicators in Table 3 is as follows: 
SMART(i): This is the intensity-of-control variable multiplied by an indicator of 
competitiveness, in this case the real exchange rate. The logic is that one of the most 
effective ways of countervailing the featherbedding effect of capital controls is to keep the real 
exchange rate competitive, and thus expose local businesses to the global market as much 
as possible; hence the more competitive the exchange rate, the ‘smarter’ any controls that are 
in force will be. 
SMART(ii):is (control2. (80-current competitiveness index rank). The index rank is the rank of 
country competitiveness (out of 80 countries) made up of two subindices, the quality of the 
national business environment and the degree of ‘company sophistication’, indicating the 
strength of within-company deterrents to rent-seeking (see note 3 to table 3).  
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countries which keep their real exchange rate competitive even 
whilst controls are in force tend not to suffer net negative 
impacts of controls on growth and, as illustrated in Table 1, the 
interaction term between controls and competitiveness 
(SMART(ii)) is a significant influence on the growth rate of GNP. 
In the countries, in other words, where there is sufficient political 
and institutional ingenuity to be able to neutralise the feather-
bedding effect of control, what results is not only short-term 
protection  of jobs but long-term improvement of average 
productivity. We find that if either of the SMART indicators of 
capital controls is inserted into the growth equation, it becomes 
significant (SMART (i)at the 10% level and SMART(ii) at the 5% 
level), whereas the raw controls variable, as we earlier saw, had 
no significant impact on growth, as per the findings of Rodrik 
and others. 
 
                          
 
                       Figure 3. Real exchange rate, controls and growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Small-sample analysis 
 
           The panel-data analysis of Table 3  tells us relatively little about 
patterns of causation, and in particular about the causation from controls to 
the distribution of income to political security which is the driver behind Figure 
1. In order to gain more purchase over these mechanisms of causation, 
specifically in relation to the countries most severely affected by the global 
crisis from 1997 onward, we now present case-study analysis of the incidence 
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and apparent impact of controls in six countries implicated in that crisis: 
Thailand, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Turkey. 
 
The determinants of controls : as shown by equation 2 in Table 3, the 
propensity to impose controls is endogenous to ‘perceived insecurity’, which is 
a blend of economic instability and the fragility of the regime. The case 
studies illustrate that insecure governments, in many cases, are particularly to 
avoid the risk of additional political instability entailed in accepting an IMF 
reform programme . In Malaysia, it was quite clear that avoidance of an 
encounter with the IMF was a key motivation behind the Prime Minister’s 
imposition of controls in 1998 (Thirkell-White, 2005), after a whole year of 
attempting to shelter the economy via the orthodox route of budgetary cuts 
and interest-rate increases. 
The impact of controls on economic efficiency (equation 1): as in the analysis 
of Rodrik(1998) the imposition of controls has a neutral impact on productivity 
averaged across the entire sample, but as we saw in Figure 3 there is a wide 
scatter of outcomes around this result, with controls having the effect of 
reducing, having no effect on or even being consistent with a increase in 
productivity depending on the incentives to competitiveness being given at the 
same time. We can now explore some of these incentives. In Malaysia, the 
imposition of controls was accompanied by increases in subsidies for training, 
specifically aimed at the manufacturing sector (which had a relatively high 
ratio of local ownership) and not at the services sector, especially the financial 
sector (which had a higher ratio of foreign ownership). Within the 
manufacturing sector, particular favours were shown to the small-enterprise 
sector, which was less likely than the large-enterprise sector to seek to exert 
reverse leverage on government in terms of demands for patronage (Malaysia 
2003). And within the large-enterprise sector, although controls were quite 
clearly imposed to protect powerful supporters of the Prime Minister, Dr 
Mahathir, competition was nonetheless sustained and encouraged between 
these supporters, with the consequence that in the manufacturing sector, by 
contrast with the primary and tertiary sectors – notably the financial sector -, 
productivity did not fall in the post-control period (Duasa 2004, chapter 8)19. 
By contrast, In Brazil and Thailand, fewer countervailing measures were put in 
place (e.g. the SMART index was lower – Table 4), and the growth of the 
manufacturing sector, in which technical external economies were able to be 
realised, was less. We see this as the main reason for Edison and Reinhart’s 
                                                 
19 Among the performance incentives deployed in the Malaysian manufacturing sector during 1998-
2000 were: 
(i) training and directed credit for small enterprises; 
(ii) instructions by manufacturing industry to businesses to cluster production in higher yield 
plants; 
(iii) financial support for upgrading technology, enhancement of automation and deepening of 
local linkages in the electronics and electrical products and IT industries, especially 
within the Multi-Media Super Corridor(MSC); 
(iv) government financial support for diversification into export-industries with high local 
content, together with instructions to banks to favour these industries; 
(v) supplementation of the budget of the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority for the 
promotion of export industries. 
Detail of these measures is provided by Duasa(2004), chapter 8, and online from the National 
Economic Action Council at http://www.mir.com.my/lb/ econ plan/. 
 19
finding(2001:533)  that, in terms of desired growth and interest-rate impacts in 
Brazil and Thailand , ‘the controls which were in force did not deliver much of 
what was intended’ . They did not deliver, we argue, because they were not 
‘smart’ enough in defending against the inevitable bias of controls in favour of 
rent-seekers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity impacts and their consequences (equation 3) 
As has been observed on a time-series basis in Malaysia (Duasa 2004; 
chapter 6) and on a cross-section basis in Table 3 above, the imposition of 
controls tends to reduce income inequality20, and this gives it additional 
political appeal, by enabling it to justify controls in the eyes of a group (the 
urban working class) with increasing political influence, and also (in lower-
income countries) in the eyes of aid donors. This  equity impact operates 
through a variety of channels. One is by protecting employment, and 
increasing the share of labour’s to capital’s earnings . A second, as Table 4 
illustrates, is by inserting a fire-retardant door which limits the extent to which 
economic crisis turns into political crisis, and thus sustaining the level of 
investment, which exists in a two-way positive relationship with equality of 
income (Alesina and Perotti 1996). In Malaysia and Thailand, the imposition of 
controls (most of them very short-term in Thailand’s case), gave the 
government short-term protection against the accusation of being powerless 
to cope with the impacts of sudden withdrawals of hot money21, and because 
the government was seen as being as being pro-active in face of socially 
divisive impacts of globalisation, its political security was protected (in terms 
of Figure 1, its survival line was ‘pushed down’ by controls) and there was 
little civil violence, and relatively little capital flight, and no vicious circle linking 
inequality to loss of investment. In Bolivia, by contrast, the centre-right 
government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada disdained to intervene during 
1999-2003 in face of growing demands for capital controls and other 
measures to ‘control globalisation in the interests of the poor’, notably by 
securing a higher price or added value for natural gas exports; a ‘multiplier’  of 
increasing civil violence, capital flight and inequality was superimposed on to 
the initial impact of the global recession, and in riots in February and October 
of 2003, over one hundred people were killed, leading eventually to the 
resignation of the Sanchez de Losada government. Indonesia and Argentina 
represent intermediate cases, in which short-term increases in controls were 
imposed in the midst of violence (not as serious or pervasive as that which 
                                                 
20 The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammed, was well aware of this. ‘More than any other 
country’, he wrote, ‘Malaysia needed to have control over its economy. Malaysia’s economic focus 
was not only on GDP growth, but also the distributive effects of growth’ (Mohammed 2000:19-20, 
quoted in Abdelal and Alfaro 2003). 
21 It is also suggested by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti(1995) and Rohmer(2004) that the costs of losing 
political support and thus the ‘need’ for controls are higher in dictatorships (and in limited democracies 
such as Malaysia)  than in democratic regimes. 
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occurred in Bolivia) and were then partially ‘bought out’ by IMF rescue 
operations.
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 Table 4. Six ‘crisis’ countries; Economic and political response to capital control 
 
 
 Crisis 
period* 
Gini 
coefficien
t 2003 
Capital controls Economic 
consequences: annual 
growth during crisis 
period of: 
Political violence: 
       Type and
intensity 
(see Note) 
Countervailing 
measures 
GDP Manufactur
ing 
Nature Apparent
consequen
ces for 
investment 
Brazil     1999-2002 63% Minimum holdings
of government 
bonds by banks 
increased, March 
1999. Average IMF 
score during crisis 
period:11.0 
 Some,mostly in 
manufacturing 
sector 
2.9 3.3 Minor: no civil
deaths during 
crisis period 
 Combined 
direct and 
portfolio inflow 
during crisis 
period:$92.8bn 
Malaysia       1997-2000 44% Initially imposed
September 1998, 
relaxed 
progressively Feb 
1999 – Feb 2001. 
Average IMF score 
during crisis 
period:9.5 
Flexible exchange 
rate policy 
maintained. 
Subsidies and 
training launched in 
favour specifically 
of small industries, 
especially in 
manufacturing 
sector (see note 
20) 
2.1 5.1 Minor: no
civilian deaths 
Combined 
direct and 
portfolio inflow 
during crisis 
period:$92.8bn 
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Thailand       1997-8 43% Imposed May 1997,
eased Jan 1998,  
until IMF 
agreement. 
Average IMF score 
during crisis 
period:9.5 
 Few -0.8 2.4 Minor: no
civilian deaths 
 Combined 
direct and 
portfolio inflow 
during crisis 
period: 
$21.0bn 
Argentina       2000-03 58% Generally
moderate, but 
severe Dec 2001- 
April 2002, when 
personal savings 
were blocked. 
Average IMF score 
during crisis period: 
12.5 
Few Moderate: 
violent protests 
against 
freezing of 
savings – 10-
15 deaths In 
early 2002 
Severe esp. 
Oct 01 – Mar 
02 
Bolivia      1999-03 59% No significant
restrictions since 
1996. Average IMF 
score during crisis 
period:4.0 
Not applicable: no 
capital controls 
1.8 3.1 Severe: at 
least 95 deaths 
in Feb. and 
October 2003 
Severe – 
dramatic fall in 
2003, 
particularly 
during 
episodes of 
violence 
Combined 
direct and 
portfolio inflow 
during crisis 
period: $3.6bn  
Indonesia      1997-2000 32% Severe, during
1998, loosened 
after IMF 
agreement. IMF 
score in 2003:12 
Few -2.7 -0.8 Moderate: 
looting of  
shops and 
police 
repression: c. 
30  deaths 
during 1999 
Capital flight 
1999-, 
eventually 
reversed. 
Combined 
direct and 
portfolio inflow 
during crisis 
period:- 
$10.8bn 
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 Sources: as for table 3 plus, for columns 6-7: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, Country economic time series 
(indices 1995=100). Post-2001 data for Argentina and Bolivia from Bolivia, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (www. ine.gov.bo); for 
column 8: H. Strand, L. Wilhelmsen and N. P. Gleditsch, Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, International Peace Research Institute 
Oslo in collaboration with Department of Peace and Conflict Research Institute, Uppsala University. 
 
Note. ‘IMF score’ is the arithmetic sum of  types of controls in force as assessed by the IMF, minimum 0 and maximum 13: for a 
categorisation of these controls, see note 1 to table 3.  
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4. Policy implications.  The case for ‘smart’ capital controls 
 
                    We have attempted to make three specific contributions. First, as 
already acknowledged by some authors, the decision to impose capital 
controls is endogenous to the state of the domestic economy; what we believe 
we have also shown is that it is also endogenous to the state of the domestic 
political system, represented here by the country’s political instability rating. 
For a regime which believes itself fragile and in need especially of shoring up 
its support from domestic lower-income groups, capital controls, on our 
evidence, represent a politically effective  way of ‘throwing sand in the wheels 
of international finance’ – as our case-study work illustrates in relation to the 
countries which did and did not impose controls during the recent recession. 
          Second, beyond their much-researched influences on the level 
and stability of interest rates and investment, capital controls also have an 
apparently positive influence on the level of income equality which has been 
little documented. This operates not only directly by protecting segments of 
local industry and employment in them, but also indirectly by pre-empting 
what, in the absence of any shelters against damaging influences of 
globalisation, have in some cases become disastrous rifts between 
government and the losers from its crisis-coping strategy. By preventing 
conflict, in other words, controls have prevented a multiplier being added, via 
the deterrent effects of political violence, to the outflows of capital which 
caused the controls to be imposed in the first place. 
                   Third, even if capital controls are politically effective, economically 
they may be inefficient, notably in terms of their effects on incentives: they 
may encourage rent-seeking and thereby lower productivity, and clearly have 
done so in some countries. However, this effect is neither uniform nor 
unpreventable: as illustrated by our Figures 2 and 3, governments’ capacity 
and willingness to counterbalance the featherbedding effects of protection (in 
the model below, the coefficient a2) has varied across countries, and with it 
the overall cost to benefit ratio of imposing controls.  In some parts of the 
literature (eg. Eichengreen 1999) this featherbedding effect has been 
accepted as part of life: an inevitable opportunity cost of control. We argue, by 
contrast, that this is not the case. The extent to which controls have been 
made ‘smarter’ by countervailing measures varies enormously across 
countries, and these differences in the policy environment of control have 
been reflected in growth rates, through the crises which we have examined, 
not only of overall GDP but also of the composition of output; in general 
countries with smarter controls have higher rates of growth of manufacturing 
output.  We conclude that considerable and as yet unexploited scope exists 
for making capital controls ’smarter’ still by embedding into them devices 
which counteract incentives to rent-seek, and push them rightwards along the 
horizontal axis of Figure 2 . In conclusion, we consider the possibilities for 
achieving this. 
 
 
  The first possible approach is what was done in Malaysia:  
countervailing expenditures, explicitly in support of small-scale, locally owned 
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manufacturing enterprises with high local content which offer the possibility of 
both a political and a productivity bonus.  Keeping controls as a strictly 
temporary crisis measure, as was done in Malaysia during but was not done 
in industrialised countries during the 1960s and 1970s, also helps22.The 
second possibility is a performance contract,  which ties government 
resources such as subsidised credit or training support to achieved levels of 
productivity (or, as appropriate, exports) within firms which are protected by 
capital controls. This simulates the effect of exposure to competition. A third 
option is not to simulate, but to execute, the opening up of  markets which are 
protected by capital controls to competition – in other words to intensify 
liberalisation in product markets, at the same time as it is being resisted in 
capital markets. This harmonises with the often-affirmed principle (e.g. Gibson 
and Tsakolotos 1994) of  getting the sequence of liberalisation right, and in 
particular liberalising product markets in advance of capital markets.  
 
        Although it is commonplace that policy learning and policy 
convergence have been, in general, a positive consequence of the 
globalisation process ( e.g. Simmons and Elkins 2004) many opportunities for 
such learning are not being taken, in part for want of evidence about what 
particular policies achieve, or because of suspicions about how well policy 
innovations will transplant (e.g. Abdelal and Alfaro 2003). This paper has 
sought to argue that the adoption of  measures to make capital controls  
’smarter’ in the sense above described might be an important way in which 
governments could learn from one another to adapt the international financial 
architecture to their own needs in a manner which does not reduce global 
welfare.
                                                 
22 Initially, in September 1998, non-residents were required to wait one year before converting ringgit 
proceeds from the sale of Malaysian securities. In February 1999 this regulation was replaced with a 
sliding scale of exit taxes on capital gains, ranging from 10 to 30%, and this was further softened in 
September 1999 to a flat 10 per cent exit tax, which was withdrawn in February 2001. 
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Appendix 1. The model 
 
Notation 
 
W = government’s welfare function  
Y = income 
G(Y) -= Gini coefficient of inequality of income 
σ(Y) = instability of income 
P = ‘political costs’ of reform 
I = ‘intensity’ of reform 
(a measure of the rate of deflation of personal income of ‘politically sensitive’ 
groups)  
N = workforce 
C = a measure of the intensity with which controls are applied (dummy 
variable) 
R = investment in encouragement of competition, ‘agencies of restraint’ etc. 
S = a vector of ‘shock parameters’ which are able to disturb the feasibility 
frontier 
 
Total impact 
W = W1+ W2  = F (Y/N, P)                                                                (1) 
 
Government welfare depends on an economic measure (productivity) and a 
measure of political risk 
 
The ‘efficiency component’ of the model                                          (2) 
W1  =    Y= a0 + a1C(P) +a2R(C)                                                                                                       
           N 
 
Whence (∂(Y/N)/ ∂C) = a1 + a2 ∂R/∂C; positive if a1> a2∂R/∂C       (3) 
 
Note: controls are endogenous, i.e. are more likely to be imposed by 
organisations operating at high levels of vulnerability (P) 
 
 
The ‘equity’/’’political stability’ component of the model 
 
Political risk is defined by the relationship 
 
W2 = -P = a3 + a4I +a5σ(Y) + a6S                                                               (4) 
 
Instability of income and interest rates is reduced by controls 
 
σ(Y) = a7 – a8C, a8<0                                                                      (5)  
 
Economic gains from reform are defined by 
 
Y  = a9 + a10I             a10>0                                                             (6)                                           
N 
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Government maximises the net benefit from reform, i.e. the difference 
between economic gains and political costs from reform: 
 
W  = W1 + W2 =  Y    - P   = (a9 -a3) + (a10  - a4) I      -a5(a7 – a8C) -a6S       (7) 
                           N 
 
Subject to the survival constraint: Y/P > (Y/P)*                                         (8) 
 
Minimising the Lagrangean:  L =(a9 -a3) + (a10  - a4) I      -a5(a7 – a8C(a3 + a4I 
+a5σ(Y) + a6S)) -a6S  -λ  [ (Y/P )- (Y/P)*  ], 
 
∂L/ ∂C =           a5a8 (a3 + a4I +a5σ(Y))  = 0                                             (9a) 
 
∂L/ ∂I  =            a10  - a4 (1-a5C)            =  0                                            (9b) 
 
∂L/ ∂λ =          ( Y/P )- (Y/P)*                =  0                                             (9c) 
 
                                                       
 
Solving the set of equations (9a) to (9c) for the optimal level of controls C*, 
 
C* = a10 -  φ                                                                                                       (10) 
         φa5  a5 
 
where φ = -a3a5a8 –a52a8(σ(Y))
                   a5a8I 
 
and from (7) the impact of controls is 
 
 
dW   = (∂W1/ ∂C) +(∂W2/ ∂C) = a1 +a2 (∂R/∂C) + a5a8                   (11) 
dC 
 
This overall impact varies according to the extent of  the disincentives to rent 
seeking   (∂R/∂C) ; the influences of controls on instability of income and 
thence on political risk (  a5,a8), the extent to which productivity is reduced by 
controls (a1), the extent to which that impact can be offset by efficiency-
enhancing measures (a2) and the relative weight put by the government on 
productivity in relation to political risk (F; not specified formally in (11). 
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Appendix 2. Data on capital controls 
 
The source of these data is IMF,  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions, various issues. Until 1997 information is provided 
only on a one-zero basis in response to the question: ‘Do any restrictions exist 
on payments in respect of capital transactions? (There are also questions on 
related matters, such as whether a special exchange rate regime exists on 
capital transactions.) After 1997 the question on capital controls is 
disaggregated: eleven types of capital control are distinguished (on capital 
market securities, money market instruments, collective investment securities, 
derivatives and other instruments, commercial credits, financial credits, 
guarantees, direct investments, liquidation of direct investments, real estate 
transactions, and personal capital transactions) and two types of ‘specific 
provision’ (related to commercial banks and to institutional investors). For a 
given country, the ’pervasiveness of control’ can thus after 1997 be given a 
score of one to thirteen. 
 
Hence entries for each country are on a one-zero scale until 1996,and on a 
scale of 1-13 after 1997. Continuous one-zero scales for each country are 
formed in two different ways: 
(1) Reducing all values to a one-zero scale: by setting an arbitrary cut-off 
of nine controls in force, and (for years after 1997) allocating a score of 
1 to countries with more than nine controls in force, and 0 to countries 
with less than nine controls. 
(2) Expanding all values to a thirteen-point scale: by deriving 
disaggregated measures of control, for years before 1997,from the 
reports of World Bank/IMF financial-sector missions. 
 
Results using each of these composite scales are reported in the regression 
analyses of table 3 above.  
 
The raw IMF data for each country are reported in the table below. 
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Country 1979                         80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Argentina                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 7 8 8 8 10 9 
Bangladesh                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 13 13 13 13 12 12 
Bolivia 0                  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Botswana                   Nd nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 12 4 4 5 5 5 
Brazil 1 1                 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 11 12 12 12 12 9 
Chile                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 13 13 13 13 6 6 
China                   Nd nd nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 11 12 11 12 12 12 
Ecuador                  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 
Ethiopia                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 8 10 10 10 10 12 
Ghana 1                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  10 10 10 10 10 10 
India 1                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  13 13 13 13 13 13 
Indonesia                    11 11 11 11 11 11 
Kenya 1                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  6 6 6 6 6 6 
(South) 
Korea 
1                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  12 11 12 12 11 11 
Malawi                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  11 11 11 11 11 11 
Malaysia                   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  12 12 12 12 12 12 
Mexico 0                  0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  10 10 10 11 11 10 
Mozambique Nd                  nd nd nd nd nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  13 13 13 13 13 13 
Nigeria 1 1                 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 5 7 6 6 6 6 
Pakistan                   1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 
Peru 0                  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Philippines                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Poland Nd                  nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 12 12 12 12 12 10 
Russian 
Federation 
Nd                  nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 1 1 1 1 10 12 13 13 13 12 10 
Sri Lanka                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 12 13 13 13 13 13 
Thailand                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 
Turkey 1                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Uganda                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Venezuela                   0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 5 9 
Zambia 1                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Zimbabwe                   Nd Nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 11 11 13 13 13 13 
Sample 
mean 
                         
From 1979-1996, information given consists of a yes/no answer to the question: are restrictions on payments for capital transactions in force? 
After 1997 (shaded area) it consists of the number of types of restrictions on capital movements in force (minimum 0 maximum 13) 
33  

 35
 
